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Abstract
Executive management involvement hasbeen identified as a key factor in
information systems development projects. This paper examines the role upper management
played in eight information systems projects undertaken at De Lage Landen Financial
Services, Inc. in order to determine what executive management activities helped or hindered
successful project completion. Information was collected via guided interviews with project
managers and business users. A set of executive management characteristics emerged that
closely paralleled those that the project management literature defines as belonging to the
project sponsor. The findings support the common beliefs that executive management should
maintain minimal involvement in the day-to-day activities of the project, but should be
actively involved in setting the project goals and aiding the project team in navigating the
political landscape. Project managers need to be aware of these characteristic activities in
order to secure help management intervention and to prevent negative management
involvement in a project.
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Introduction
Information systems (IS) development projects playa critical role in the execution of
corporate business strategies. For example, information systems can enable cost reductions
through automation; appropriately designed cost tracking and customer relationship
management systems can provide crucial business intelligence; and manufacturing and
enterprise planning systems can aid standardization ofproducts and processes in a company.
In spite of the increasing business dependency on information systems projects, many
projects still finish over budget, miss delivery dates, and/or fail to meet user requirements.!
Edward Yourdan (1997) in his introduction to Death March Projects writes: "industry
sources ... and statistical data from metrics experts ... suggest that the average project is
likely to be 6 to 12 months behind schedule and 50 to 100% over budget." As the pace of
business increases-business must now be conducted at the so-called "speed of the
Intemet"-and the cost of IS development rises, pressure to insure successful systems
implementations will also increase. Given this need to improve IS project management,
factors that contribute to completing a project successfully deserve to be analyzed in order to
allow their systematic application to a broad range ofIS initiatives.
One such success factor is the role upper (or executive) management plays in IS
project success: as Mohan (1997) says, "Top management can be responsible for projects that
fail." Many project management textbooks and articles state that ''top management support or
involvement is essential for a project's success.,,2 These statements certainly appear true.
Often, however, the nature of this involvement is vaguely defined: funding projects and
allocating resources are commonly cited examples ofexecutive involvement, as is the
! The Standish Group's Chaos Report (1994) indicates that only 16% oflS projects fmish on-time, on-
budget, and on-specification. Internal documents at De Lage Landen Financial Services, the company
under study, cite the figure at approximately 50%, based on a Gartner Group study.
2 Meredith and Mantel (1995; pp. 127,203,210,287), Jiang, Klein, and Means (2000). Several
quantitative studies have identified top management support as a critical success factor (Standish
Group (1994, 1995), Sambamurthy and Kirsch (2000), Curtis, Krasner, and Iscoe (2000)).
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ephemeral "political problem solving," e.g., Yourdan (1997; chapter 2). At other times,
executive involvement is embodied in the role ofaproject sponsor, who serves as the link
between the project manager and the corporate executives (Kerzner 1995). Given this broad
spectrum of behaviors, identifying attributes of top management involvement that positively
affect a project's success should enable IS managers to improve their projects' probability of
success--or at least help them work better with upper management.
Literature Review
When direct discussion ofexecutive management occurs in the project management
and IS literature, it usually takes one of two forms. The fIrst type ofarticle or book usually
invokes a platitude similar to "upper management support is essential for a project's success"
without offering a great deal ofdetail. The second category portrays theproper role ofthe
executive to be a project sponsor, i.e., someone who is removed from the day to day activities
of the project, but is ultimately responsible for its success or failure. The role ofthe sponsor is
well defIned in project management literature.
Empirical Data Concerning Top Leadership and Project Management
Several empirical studies have established that top management involvement or
support in a project is critical to its success. Bartholomew (1997) cites a study indicating
"that 58% of manufacturing executives believe ERP [enterprise resource planning systems]
implementations fail because ofa lack of management education about the project. ..." The
Standish Group's Chaos Report (1994), based on surveys ofIS projects in over 360
organizations, ranks "Executive Management Support" as the second most important success
factor in project management, falling only slightly behind "User Involvement." The study
also cites the lack ofexecutive management support as the fourth most common impediment
to a project's success and the fIfth most common cause ofproject failure. The Standish
Group's follow-up report, Unfinished Voyages (1995), creates a list of success factors as a
means ofevaluating a project's chance of success on a scale of 1 to 100. Top management
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support is the second most important factor, with a weight of 16; again, it falls only behind
user involvement, which has a weight of 19.
An ffiM study of 800 companies (Luftman 1998) put forth that the key to successful
technology implementations (which is what a large IS project is) is that IS must be aligned
with the business. In this study, the leading impediment to achieving that essential alignment
was a lack of senior management support for IS.
Jiang, Klein, and Means (2000) conducted a survey of slightly more than 100 firms.
They found that the most significant factors affecting a development team's performance
were user and top management support. They also mention several other studies conducted in
the late 1970s, such those done by R.W. Zmud, that relate executive involvement and project
success. These sources were unavailable.
The Project Sponsor
In finns that have a well-established project management culture, a formal project
sponsor works with the project manager on behalfofexecutive management. This role is well
defmed. Kerzner (1995) notes that the project sponsor:
• Establishes the project's objective.
• Aids project planning.
• Resolves conflicts between project stakeholders.
• Sets priorities.
• Explains potential political situations the project manager may encounter.
• Interacts with external stakeholders, such as vendors. This usually happens at a peer
to peer level; i.e., executives deal with other company executives, not the people
directly involved with the project.
To perform these activities successfully, the sponsor needs to have timely, accurate, and
honest data about the project's progress. It is the responsibility ofthe project manager to
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provide that data. Ahituv, Zviron, and Glezer (1999) outline a set oftop management tools to
be used for monitoring IS projects. They also advocate that projects be fullymanaged not by
IS, but by the business. The implication oftheir view is that IS is too important to be left to
itself.
Rosenthal (2001), Hermann (1999), and Bloom (1996) generally concur with
Kerzner's description of the project sponsor. Kerzner differs from them, however, in that he
adamantly believes that the project sponsor should work behind the scenes; the project
sponsor should act as a "big brother" or mentor to the project manager, and not be actively
involved in the project. Most other authors assume executive management or the executive
sponsor should be involved more openly and directly.
Wong (1996) 3 and Brendler (2001) add that executive management, whether a
formal sponsor or not, must have an awareness of a project's organizational impact in order
to facilitate the changes resulting from that impact.
Many of the project sponsor's activities, such as providing money and other
resources to the project and monitoring the project are support related. These tasks are
essential to a project's success, but are not discussed in this paper, since both are already
present in the projects under investigation. Griffith (1999), Smith (1999), and Rinaldi (1992)
discuss these and other related issues.
Another View
The predominate view ofISchange is that it is a top-down process; i.e., executives or
some other executive-anointed individual are not only responsible for the project itself, but
are also responsible for the acceptance of the changes that system will bring. In this view,
change flows from the top of the organization downward:
3 Wong writes about expert system (ES) projects, differentiating between these and other IS projects,
possibly because of the extensive amount ofend-user involvement necessary in designing and ES.
Nevertheless, his general points should also be applicable to large IS projects.
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"The change process begins with a clear, long-tenn, top-management commitment to
the hard work of altering corporate culture, beginning with the leaders." (O'Toole
1999)
"Overt Sponsorship And Championing From The Top. This cannotbe delegated
and cannot be a secondary priority. The organizationneeds to see that this is a
passionate priority of the leader to the point that the leader is seriously changing his
or her own behaviors and is investing significant time in the initiative." (Rosenthal
2001)
"Upper management must be involved in the process [enterprise-resource planning]
during and after the implementation to ensure its success." (Bartholomew 1997)
"Clearly the success ofthese implementations is dependent on the support and
dedication of executive and middle management." (Bartholomew 1997)
"[A project] needs senior management buy-in to succeed." (Griffith, Zammuto, and
Aiman-Smith 1999)
Not all authors, however, believe change must emanate from the top throughout the rest of
the organization. Butcher and Atkinson (2000) believe that change can be effected in an
organization from the bottom up. They advocate developing "pockets ofexcellence" that
create change in a relatively small area of the company-perhaps a department, a plant, or
even a work group. The success ofthat team's change can then be used to spearhead other,
broader initiatives within the company.
Methodology
This paper examines the role of upper management in eight IS software development
projects at De Lage Landen Financial Services (DLL). The software produced by these
projects was used solely within DLL; the software is not publicly available. For the purposes
of this analysis, top management consists of vice-presidents and above. Data concerning the
role upper management played in the projects were collected via guided interviews with the
IS project managers. In addition to the project managers, some non-IS employees were
interviewed concerning top management involvement because the results of infonnal
preliminary interviews suggested IS and non-IS employees viewed upper management
involvement differently; e.g., one project was deemed to have "no upper management"
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involvement by IS, while the non-IS employees thought otherwise. Appendix A provides a
brieflist ofquestions asked. Appendix B is a briefdescription ofDLL's IS development
project life cycle: one sought after characteristic was whether executive involvement changed
over the course ofa project. The goal was to use the collected data to create a series of
characteristic activities executive management performed that either helped or hindered a
project's success. These characteristics should be similar to the roles played by the
literature's theoretical project sponsor. Although DLL did not have an explicit project
sponsor role until mid-2000, an executive often filled that role, notwithstanding the lack of an
explicit name.
De Lage Landen Financial Services
De Lage Financial Services4 primarily provides private label leasing to industry.
Private label leasing enables companies to offer a leasing package under their own name
without having to actually concern themselves with financing and processing the lease. DLL
serves a variety of industries, including office equipment (typically photocopiers), healthcare,
materials handling and construction, telecommunications, and agricultural equipment. DLL is
part ofDe Lage Landen International, a fully owned subsidiary ofThe Rabobank Group,
headquartered in the Netherlands. With over $325 billion in assets, Rabobank is the only
privately held bank in the world to hold a AAA rating by both S&P and Moody's. Moreover,
Rabobank's stability has allowed them to hold these ratings continuously since 1982.
Project Data Set
All of the projects except e-commerce enhanced or changed DLL's Application
Tracking System (ATS). This is DLL's primary lease management system. The e-commerce
project added an internet based front end to ATS.
4 Additional corporate information is available at www.delagelandenus.com. The name will be
abbreviated DLL throughout this paper.
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Table 1outlines the. projects and their characteristics under consideration:5
Table I-Project Characteristics
Project Staff Months Size Complexity Scolle Data Source
Credit Scoring 1 4.5 15 110 3 330 Project
Manager
Credit Scoring 2 5.5 12 150 3 450 Project
Manager
E-Commerce 10 18 400 3 1200 Project
Restructuring Manager
Imaging 3.5 9 500 1 500 Project
Manager
Lease Accounting 5 15 130 2 260 End User
Reconciliation (LARe)
Remittance Processing 4.5 15 125 3 375 Project
Improvements (RPD) Manager
Vendor Maintenance 4 6 60 2 120 End User
Year 2000 Program 7 18 1500 1 1500 Project
Renovations (Y2K) Manager
The characteristics ofthe listed projects are:
Staff: the number of internal IS employees assigned to the project. IS staff assigned to a
project includes project managers, programmer/analysts, business analysts (these are non-
technical project team members), and testers. Programmers and business analysts are
typically assigned to a project on a full-time basis. Programming staffmay either be
consultants or employees-DLL treats consultants assigned to a project as employees for
project management purposes. Each project also had an IS project manager6 assigned to it,
although his involvement was notnecessarily full-time. Project managers are usually full-
time employees (exception: the e-commerce restructuring project had three managers during
its run, one of whom was a consultant). All references to project managers in this paper
pertain to DLL's internal project managers unless otherwise noted. Formal IS testers are
5 The senior vice-president of information technology asked that no detailed money figures be used.
The projects ranged in cost from $250,000 to $1,250,000. In general, the greater the scope, the more
the project cost. A brief description ofeach project is located in Appendix C.
6 The project managers share two characteristics: these projects were their first or second major project
at DLL and all were relatively young at the time ofthe project (the oldest was 36).
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rarely used on anything other than an ad-hoc basis. The notable.exception to this was the
Y2K project, which had three IS employees engaged in testing for several months. The
staffing level reflects the average number ofpeople over the life of the project. Occasionally,
external vendors develop software for DLL. The vendor's staff is not included in this count
because DLL has little control over the vendor's development process. The vendor and DLL
do work together, however, to implement the software. The effect ofvendor personnel on the
staffing level is negligible for the projects under discussion.
Months: the calendar time the IS department spent on the project from requirements
gathering through implementation. Post-implementation work is not included. All of the staff
did not necessarily work for the entire time.
Size: the number ofprograms, files, and other technical objects the project affected. While
more objects can imply increased complexity, this is not always the case. The estimates were
provided by the IS change control committee representative. When this figure was
unavailable, the project manager's estimate was used. All ofthe projects were written for the
same computer system, except for the e-commerce initiative, so the object counts are
comparable. The e-commerce object count is a rough estimate ofwhat the size would be if
the system had been implemented on the same platform as the others.
Complexity: the relative difficulty ofthe project. For example, althoughthe Y2K project was
large with respect to the number ofobjects affected, creating difficulty in administering the
project, it was not complex. On the other hand, the LARC project touched relatively few
objects, but was far more difficult conceptually than the Y2K project. These numbers were
provided by the IS project managers.
Scope: Multiplying the number of objects by the conceptual complexity yields a rough
estimation of the overall project scope or size: the larger the number, the greater the scope.
The projects are all of approximately the same scope, although the e-commerce and Y2K
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projects were larger than the others were. An alternative scope measurement is to multiply the
conceptual complexity, the number of objects, the duration, and the staffing level
(multiplying the latter two terms actually yields the number ofman-hours the project
consumed). The duration and staffing levels are, however, largely dependent on both the
complexity and size of the project. Therefore, the former scope measurement is used.
These projects were selected because of their rough similarity in scope. Most
improved existing procedures or automated manual processes, rather than introducing
dramatically new technology or processes to the company. When the company did implement
new technology (e~g., imaging required scanners and optical storage media), proven
technology was used. The projects ran from late 1996 through the first quarter of 2001.
All ofthe projects in question were classified by the company as "Vital Initiatives."
Vital Initiatives are high priority projects that DLL's Executive Committee believes are
critical to the company's strategic business plan. The projects are allocated sufficient, but not
an overly generous amount ofresources to achieve their primary goals; they also have a
relatively high profile throughout the company, assuring that there is some minimum level of
upper management involvement in the projects.
Table 2 outlines the outcome of the projects from a project management perspective.
The outcome is measured according to whether the vital initiative met its budget, deadline,
and specifications. It should be noted that although a number ofprojects did not meet their
original expectations, all achieved whatever the primary project goal was. For example,
Credit Scoring 2's primary goal was to introauce several new credit scoring models to the
company. Additionally, the company desired some new functionality not available in the
existing system, such as fraud detection. The project team implemented the new models, but
not the fraud detection module. Therefore, the project was an overall success, but not what
was originally planned, resulting in a specifications score of zero. The number ofproject
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management characteristics the project met determines the "project management score,"
ranging in value from zero to three.
Table 2-Project Management, Outcomes
Project Schedule Budget Specifications Project
i\Ianagement
Score
Credit Scoring 1 No No Yes 1
Credit Scoring 2 No No No 0
E-Commerce No No No 0
Imaging Yes Yes Yes 3
LARC Yes Yes No 2
RPO Yes No No 1
Vendor Maintenance Yes Yes Yes 3
Y2K Yes No Yes 2
The projects are also given a customer satisfaction rating, as detailed in Table 3
(located on page 12). As noted previously, OLL produces software for internal corporate use
only. Therefore, the customers in the study are the OLL employees who use the systems. The
customer satisfaction score ranges in value from one to five, with a one indicating that the
project results completely failed to meet the users' expectations and a five indicating that the
results were exactly what the users had wanted and expected. The customer satisfaction
ratings were gathered from several sources. First, post~project documentation was used when
available. These documents record the official satisfaction rating reported to executive
management. The numbers therein are a combination of the executive sponsor's and key
users' ratings. When this number was not available, a primary business liaison was asked to
rate the project; this person not only uses the product, but also helped design it. Finally, in
cases where this was not possible (either due to the user community being too large to poll or
it being politically unwise to do so), the IS project manager provided an estimate of the result.
It is likely that all ofthe results are skewed to the high side: it would be contrary to human
nature to minimize this number when reporting to executive management or when evaluating
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one'$ own project. The relative rankings should be valid, however. This paper will examine
the project management and customer satisfaction results independently. No attempt was
made to link the two into a single overall project rating.
Table 3-Customer Satisfaction
Project Customer Satisfaction Rating Source
Credit Scoring 1 4 Project manager
Credit Scoring 2 4 Post-project documentation
E-Commerce 2 Post-project documentation
Imaging 4 Project manager
LARC 2 Business liaison
RPD 3.5 Post-project documentation.
Vendor 11aintenance 4.8 Business liaison
Y2K 5 Project manager
Data Presentation
Two sets ofdata emerge from the project and interview data. First, there is a set of
data that pertains to the scope of the projects and their outcomes. Second, characteristics of
upper management's involvement emerge from the interview data. These two data sets can
then be examined in concert to determine the relationship between project outcomes and
executive management involvement.
Project Data
Table 4 summarizes the project data:
Table 4 -Project Results Summary
Pro.iect Scope Project :\fallagement Customer
Score Satisfaction
Credit Scoring 1 330 1 4
CreditScoring 2 450 0 4
E-Commerce 1200 0 2.5
Imaging 500 3 4
LARC 200 2 2
RPD 375 1 3.5
Vendor Maintenance 120 3 4.8
Y2K 1500 2 5
In general, the small sample size precludes drawing any conclusive observations about the
relationship between the scope of the project and its project management success or customer
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satisfaction. There does not appear to be any definitive correlation between scope and either
project management or customer satisfaction. Projects with a large scope have both low and
high project management scores; e.g., the Y2K project with a scope of 1500 had a high
project management score, while the e-commerce project (1200. scope) had a zero score.
Similarly, customer satisfaction appears to be independent of the scope ofa project.
There appears to be a significant disconnect between the project management and
customer satisfaction scores. Several poorly run projects have a high customer satisfaction
score (e.g., both credit scoring projects), while some well run projects have a low customer
satisfaction (e.g., LARC). This anomaly is discussed in the sections entitled "Summary" and
"Conclusions and Recommendations."
Upper Management Characteristics
A set of common characteristics ofupper management involvement emerged from
the interviews:
• All the interviewees commented on the·amount ofupper management
involvement. All the project managers wanted upper management involved in
someway, although more than one commented that "no-one wants to be micro-
managed."
• Several discussed the lack ofclarity of their project requirements, even when
upper management was actively involved with the project.
• Over half ofthe project managers discussed the political nature ofexecutive
involvement.
• Where the projects originated appeared to be of interest to the project managers.
Many of the interviews started with statements such as "This project was started
by vice-president so and so" or "The executive committee heard that a problem
existed and wanted it solved" even before the formal questions had begun.
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• The stake upper management had in the project (other than costs) was discussed;
a "large" stake in a project was identified as a key success indiCator in the
Standish Group report (1994). This interview questions directly addressed this
issue: it did not emerge independently.
Much of the data that was gathered around these points involved anecdotal evidence. These
anecdotes will be used in the discussion sections as illustrative or supporting data. The
following section outlines the characteristic data. The section closes with the data presented
in tabular form.
Amount ofUpper Management Involvement
Almost all of upper management's involvement in the IS projects occurred either
before the project formally began (e.g., the LARe project arose from a consulting report
commissioned by management) or during the requirements definition phase of the project.
Even in those projects where micro-management was present late in the project, the
involvement usually pertained to changing or adding requirements. Implementation of those
requirements was left to the project manager's discretion. Other types of involvement in the
early stages of the project included setting deadlines (occasionally regardless ofthe project
needs and requirements), providing funding, and setting up the project team.
Defining how much management was involved is a difficult task, as a great deal
depends on the project managers' points ofview, Involvement is characterized as "high" if
the subjects used words such as "heavy," "a lot," etc. in describing management activity.
"Low" involvement is defined by the absence of indications ofhigh involvement or by
phrases such as "management left us alone" and "we were told to 'Just do it. '" In the
interviews, involvement implied activity; reporting and monitoring, for example were not
considered involvement in the project (although those are important tasks present in all of the
projects).
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Micro-management
Three project managers mentioned "micro-management." One example cited was the
decision made by the executive committee during the Y2K project to use the "windowing"
technique to solve the problem rather than the date expansion technique. This decision cost
the project team approximately five months of time. Although the project finished on-time,
freeing up the manpower from the project earlier could have enabled the company to
complete another project-or at lease save the company money by releasing the consultants.
Another example of executive micro-management occurred in the first credit scoring project.
The executives determined what the new credit scoring platform would be before the
requirements were fully set or the vendor was selected; the decision was made to move from
a computing platform regardless ofthe appropriateness of that decision.
Clear Project Objective
Since executive management originated and approved most of the projects, project
managers expected upper management to at least provide a clear sense of what the project
was supposed to accomplish, ifnot the detailed specifications. This was not always the case.
One person said, "While I didn't want to be micro-managed, some involvement would have
been nice, if only for clarifying what we should do. We took some big risks in this project.
Luckily, they turned out OK." This category does not necessarily mean that the executives
should always hand down some sort ofobjective; it is possible that the project will start
without a clear objective, but that over time, it will emerge as information becomes available.
Understanding Project Effects
Although executive management may have revealed a clear project objective, it may
not understand what is involved in the project, the effect of the project on workflow, or even
its scope. If having a clear objective means "we know what we want this project to
accomplish," then having a clear understanding ofthe project means "we know what this
project will do to us and our processes." This is important because a project can affect areas
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outside its executive sponsor's purview (intentionally or unintentionally). In these cases, it is
often necessary for the sponsor to act politically and insure the project's acceptance. In
general, if the project objective was clearly defined, executive management understood the
project ramifications. In the only example where there is a clear objective without
understanding, the LARC project, the disconnect between a clear objective and understanding
may be because management simply turned over a consultant report to the project team and
told the team to "do this."
Political Involvement
Executive management engaged in what the project managers deemed political
activity in five of the eight projects. This activity included relationship building and
negotiating, both internal and external to the organization. For example, the Credit Scoring 2
executive sponsor negotiated the price of the work the external vendor would perform. The
- .-
same sponsor also had to respond to the vendor's issues with the project manager. The RPD
sponsor had to work with the Collections department both to explain the new processes and
alleviate the fear that the process would negatively affect the Collections department.
Interestingly, the imaging project had a conflict resolution process that did not
involve management involvement. When there was a question ofwhere to introduce the
'"imaging technology next, the team looked to the Quality Department to provide a cost-benefit
analysis. In this way, inter-departmental conflict was reduced. While this reduced inter-
personal and interdepartmental conflict, it took time to reach a consensus. In a faster paced
project, a single source of solutions, i.e., the project sponsor, could speed the process.
Project Stake
One success factor in the literature was how large a stake upper management had in
the project: presumably, the more important a project, the more likely it is to be successful.
Interview subjects described the importance ofthe projects as follows:
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Table 5-Project Stakes
Project Stake Size Description
Credit Scoring 1 Large Inability to determine customers'
creditworthiness.
Credit Scoring 2 Large Same as above.
E-Commerce Restructuring Small Lack of system flexibility.
Imaging Small Wasted money.
LARC Large Large write-off if accounts were not
reconciled.
RPD Large Loss ofcustomers. Customers were
complaining about misapplied cash.
Vendor Maintenance Small Database would remain "dirty."
Responsibility for data would be
haphazardly distributed throughout
company.
Y2K Large Unable to do business.
Project Origination
While not truly a facet ofupper management involvement, this issue spontaneously
arose often during the interviews. DLL's Executive Committee is responsible for project
selection and funding, although the project concept can arise from nearly anywhere. Projects
can originate either from business needs or from other, non-business areas such as IT. Three
projects originated from outside the business: the e-commerce restructuring, LARC, and
Y2K.
Table 6--Project Origin
Project Origin
Credit Scoring 1 Business
Credit Scoring 2 Business
E-Commerce Restructuring IS
Imaging Business
LARC Consultants
RPD Business
Vendor Maintenance Business
Y2K IS
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Project Data Summary
Table 7 summarizes the upper management characteristics that emerged from the .
interviews.
Table 7-Management Characteristics Summary
Project Mgmt Micro- Clear Effects Politics Stake Origin
Amount mgmt Objective
Credit High Yes Yes Yes Yes Large Business
Scoring 1
Credit High No Yes Yes Yes Large Business
Scoring 2
E-Commerce Low No No No Yes Small IS
Imaging Low No Yes Yes No Small Business
LARC Low No Yes No No Large Consultants
RPD High Yes Yes Yes Yes Large Business
Vendor Low No No No No Small Business
Maintenance
Y2K High Yes Yes Yes Yes Large IS
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Discussion
The following sections recast the eight projects in terms ofthe characteristic
variables discussed above. Except for the amount of management involvement, the
characteristics of executive management involvement are noted in braces as they emerge in
the discussion. The amount ofmanagement is noted in the project header.
Credit Scoring 1 {High Involvement}
The credit scoring system at DLL7 is an integral part of its business: in order to
determine the credit-worthiness oflessees, data about them are put into a model which, in
conjunction with data gathered from financial information services such as Dun & Bradstreet,
computes a credit score. This credit score is then used to determine whether to approve the
lease to the customer. By late 1996, DLL's original credit scoring system, NIBS, had run into
problems. The model used to compute the credit score had little predictive value: it was
difficult to distinguish the customers who would most likely pay their loans from the ones
who would default. Additionally, the software caused the computer to freeze several times a
week. To fix the freeze, an hour-long reboot was required, leaving hundreds of employees
unable to perform their jobs. The problem was severe: employees were essentially idle for
several hours a week and the leases DLL wrote were becoming riskier; in short, DLL was in a
near crisis state. {Large Stake, Business Origin}
To fix the problem, senior management decided to replace not only the scoring
model, but also the hardware on which it ran. {Clear Objective} They set a deadline ofthree
months for the project. {Micro-management} The executive team then solicited bids from
several vendors. Most of the bids were similar: the project would take approximately
$100,0008 and- take from nine to twelve months to implement. Only one vendor offered to
complete the project in the desired time frame; their bid was also much lower than the others.
7 At the time, the company was owned by Tokai Bank (ofJapan) and operated under the name Tokai
Financial Services, Inc.
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The executive team decided to use the fast, inexpensive vendor and selected an IS project
manager to run the implementation. The project manager had no input into the technical
decision making or scheduling of the project. {Micro-management} The executive team thus
made two mistakes before the project even started. First, they decided how long the project
would take before the requirements were fully defined. That only one vendor could meet the
artificially imposed deadline should have been a warning that something was probably amiss.
Second, the executive team mistakenly decided to replace the system hardware before fully
understanding the problem. DLL only needed to replace the software-the computer freezes
were a result of the credit scorecard software, not a hardware or operating system flaw. Other
scorecards were available that ran on DLL's computer system. {Micro-management} Also,
introducing new technology, as the new scorecard platform was, in a project with a tight
deadline dramatically increases the chance ofproject delays or failure (Yourdan 1999). The
executive team would have been prudent to allow the IS team to make some of the technical
decisions, or at least present the pros and cons of the various options, instead ofm{cto-
managing the technical aspects ofthe project. Also, the decision required hiring new IS staff
to manage the platform. Needlessly deciding upon a new platform simply added unnecessary
complexity. {Project Effect, Micro-management} The project did not have a formal sponsor:
decisions were made by the executive committee as a whole, albeit guided by the CIO.
As might be expected, the three-month deadline passed. Six months after the project
began, a new IS project manager was brought in to salvage the project (the original project
manager then shifted to handle the technical portion of the project). The new project manager
re-documented the project requirements and re-solicited bids for the project. A new vendor
was selected and with their input, a clear, well-documented plan was created. Project progress
would be monitored by how well the plan's milestones were met. The project manager also
8 Again, the actual cost is disguised.
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started to communicate with the executive whose area was most affected by the project; in
effect, he cultivated a project sponsor.
The executive committee was reluctant to admit that they had wasted a substantial
amount ofmoney and did not want to restart the project. To combat this, the project manager
worked with the executive sponsor to sell the new plan to the executive committee; the
executive sponsor spent a great deal oftime trying to overcome the other executives'
resistance to starting over. Eventually, the new plan was approved. {Politics}
The new project plan also included a significant amount ofuser involvement, so the
changes that needed to be made in the credit analysts' work processes were made clear before
the project progressed too far. {Project Effect} Unfortunately, senior management insisted
that redundancy be built into the system before the users became involved; this delayed the
project by nearly a month, although the task could have been done concurrently with the
testing. {Micro-management} Nine months later, in January 1998, having spent the $100,000
of the realistic bids plus the lost costs, the company started using the new scorecard.
In spite of the delays and cost overruns, the company was satisfied with the product.
The scoring model again functioned predictively and the company's financial risk was
reduced. Also, the system was stable, so the employees became more productive.
Credit Scoring 2 {High Involvement}
The credit scorecard developed in the project described previously served DLL's core
business, office equipment, well. By the second quarter of 2000, however, the company was
using the scorecard for new types ofbusiness, such as healthcare leasing. Unfortunately, the
scoring models implemented in 1998 did not function well for the new businesses, increasing
DLL's risk on these types of leases. To alleviate the risk, much of the credit-scoring work
was done manually, a process that circumvented the system's data checking process and took
a great deal oftime. New scorecards thatwere tailored to the demands of the lines ofbusiness
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would allow the credit analysts to work more efficiently and in the same manner as the office
equipment analysts. {Project Effects} Additionally, the company had written off a substantial
amount of money due to fraud. Consequently, the risk department-those responsible for
credit-wanted to implement fraud detection software in addition to scorecards to handle the
new businesses DLL was entering. The executive committee launched a project to address
these issues in May 2000. {Large Stake, Business Origin, Clear Objective}
The company credit manager arid an IS project manager, along with the project's
executive sponsor, developed a large set of objectives for the project, including not only fraud
detection and a health care scoring model, but also a behavioral scoring model9 and other
scorecards for new businesses, such as construction and materials handling. {Clear objective}
The project was divided into three phases. The fraud detection module and the healthcare
scorecard fell into the first phase, with a scheduled implementation date of December 2000.
Discussion of the project is limited to phase one.
The project team selected a vendor to create the new healthcare model and fraud
detection module, since this type of work required experience not found within the company
(e.g., statistical modeling). Also, the old business equipment scoring model was to be
rewritten by the vendor to run on the new hardware/software package provided by the new
vendor. DLL programmers would create the interfaces between the new credit scoring model
and DLL's business system (named ATS, or Application Tracking System). At this point,
history repeated itself. The vendor estimated that the earliest the work could be completed
was by mid-February 2001. Since this conflicted with the date the executive committee had
already set, the DLL executives negotiated with the vendor for an early December delivery
date; they also managed to reduce the cost of the product by 20%. This created an extremely
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tense relationship that, in the project manager's opinion, "slowed the project considerably."
Since this relationship was expected to be a long term one, lasting at least three and probably
more than five years, a less confrontational approach may have served the company better. Of
course, it is easy to lay all of the blame on the vendor: no one forced the vendor to take the
contract. Nevertheless, the company's negotiators might have worked toward a ''win-win''
solution rather than simply attempting to drive down the costs. {Politics}
The deal DLL struck was, in fact, too good to be true: at the time of the December
deadline, the vendor had only produced exactly what was specified in the contract, which,
unfortunately, was not what DLL needed. Neither the credit-scoring engine nor the fraud
detection module worked properly. The project team decided to forego implementing the
fraud detection module at this point and focused on implementing the new scorecards. The
vendor ultimately delivered a set ofworking models in mid-February, shifting the final
project delivery date to the end ofMarch 2001. But problems in integrating the new system
with ATS further delayed the project. In late March, when asked for a new date and a
confidence level for that date by the project sponsor, the project manager replied "April 15 th,
. and about 10%." This was a poor response by the project manager-it was still too
aggressive, and once a date is quoted, regardless of the confidence level, it becomes the new
deadline. The project missed that date, too. Finally, the new scorecards-minus the fraud
detection module-went into production in mid-May 2001.
In spite of the nearly six-month delay and reduced functionality, executive
management was extremely satisfied with what the project team delivered. Work
immediately proceeded to the second phase with no changes to the project team or its
leadership.
9 A behavioral model uses customer data collected by the company to predict how that customer will
act in the future. This enables the company to save money by not having to access proprietary credit
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E-Commerce Restructuring {Low Involvement}
DLL had implemented an internet-enabled lease application product early in 1999,
which enabled vendors to enter their customers' lease applications via the internet. The
vendors and applicants saw a screen that was tailored to each individual vendor's needs. The
internet application entry screen was therefore much simpler to use than the ATS version.
The problem with the system, however, was that enabling new vendors in the system required
writing additional programs. The e-commerce team therefore wanted to re-write the system to
make it much easier to add new vendors. {Non-business origin} The team's manager
presented a case for the project to the senior vice-president ofIS. He then presented the idea
to the executive committee, which approved the project. No particular executive sponsor was
assigned to the project.
After approval, the project changed somewhat: as requirements were gathered, the
project changed from one that was supposed to improve the IS infrastructure-itselfa
relatively complex task-to a project that would fix the infrastructure and add additional, ill-
defined business functionality. Ofthe changing requirements, the project manager said, "The
project tried to be all things to all people. We eventually killed people with meetings. It
became too big." {No Clear Objective, Not Understanding Project's Effect} The project
manager believed that the scope grew because the project was "too long-term" and it was
"difficult for the business to see the benefit of changing the infrastructure." {Small Stake}
There were also problems with the scope and deadline; although senior management did not
fully understand the project, it had set a "firm" deadline. {Micro-management} An
independent consulting firm's evaluation ofthe project reveals:
"The technical team stated that a delivery date prior to March, 200I was an
unrealistic assignment, yet the January 31 date, set for business urgency, did not
permit reduced functionality."
data every time a customer wither changes a lease or applies for a new one.
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Other than approving the project and wanting it to be finished, executive
management had little involvement in the project. The project manager did believe, however,
y
that the IS executive involved with the project kept it from completely failing by negotiating
with the consulting firm that provided most of the staff for the project. Many of the
consultants had grown unhappy with the delays and lack of firm requirements and had
requested transfers to other projects. The IS executive met with the owner of the consulting
firm and worked to make sure that the staffing remained stabl~. {Politics}
The project finished nine months past its original deadline. Few people were pleased
with the results. One complaint was that although little prograniming had to be done to set up
a new vendor in the system, IS still had to maintain a large number of files to accomplish the
task. The system therefore still required skilled labor to maintain. {Not Understanding
Project's Effect}
Imaging {Low Involvement}
In mid-1998, DLL cancelled a major rewrite of the ATS system. The company did
not want to reduce its employee base-although most of the consultants employed on the
project were released-and examined a number ofsmall to mid-sized projects to engage the
now free resources. The proposal for imaging project was one of those that emerged from the
remains of the rewrite cancellation. The COO/CIOIO at the time proposed the project as a way
to improve work flow and reduce the amount ofpaper both in the building and in storage.
{Business Origination} All of the lease documentation-eontracts, changes to leases,
insurance notifications, tax status indicators, etc.-was to be electronically filed. This would
allow rapid retrieval ofthe documents and save building space. Once the team completed the
lease documentation portion of the project, it would handle other paper-intensive processes.
Another goal of the project was to eliminate the large "green-bar" printouts that ATS
10 The positions were merged for only a short time. They are currently distinct.
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produced. These were to be stored on optical storage and viewed on-line. {Clear Objective}
The cost-benefit analysis indicated that the company would save a substantial amount of
money by doing this. There was also little risk that the project could go awry, unlike some of
the other proposals. And even ifthe project failed, the loss would be minimal, as the project
was not extremely expensive. {Small Stake} The executive committee approved the project;
the COO would act as the project sponsor. Shortly after the project was approved, but before
it was funded, the project sponsor left the company. The new COO approved the project
without much examination, saying "I'd rather make a bad decision than none at all." The
project was scheduled to last nine months.
At this point, the executive sponsor left the project team alone. Decisions concerning
what process to automate-the only real point ofcontention between the various business
groups involved in the project-were made by a group ofdirectors and managers. To
facilitate decision making, the group used cost/benefit data that had been collected by the
Quality Department. There was little argument over the use of such data for project
prioritization. {Politics} The members of the team kept their managers (i.e., the executives)
informed of what was happening with the project. {Project Effects}
The project met its requirements, finished on time, and did not exceed its budget. The
user community was generally pleased with the results: lease documentationwas easily
accessible to all, reports were available on-line (reducing the chance that they would be lost),
and the expected savings benefits materialized.
LARe {Low Involvement}
One of the most important tasks DLL performs is to fund its vendors. Funding a
vendor means that DLL pays the vendor for the equipment that a customer has leased; DLL
owns the equipment and the customer then pays DLL. The accounts payable (AP) department
was responsible for insuring that the checks they produced matched the amount the company
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was supposed to fund. By early 1999, however, the AP department had lost several managers
and key department members and with them, the knowledge of how to reconcile the lease
funding. DLL faced a substantial write-off if it could not perform the reconciliation.
Additionally, the company could not accurately state its assets and liabilities. {Large Stake}
The company hired a consulting firm to develop a set of IS enhancements that would enable
the company to balance its books. {External Origin} When the requirements were completed
(with little internal assistance), the executive in charge turned them over to the LARe project
team and said, "Do this," and "Just fix it." {Lack ofclear objective} A deadline and cost were
set for the project by executive management. No specific project sponsor was selected. The
project team then set to work.
There were two conflicting entities operating in the project: the project team itself,
consisting ofIS employees, the then current AP manager, and several other business
stakeholders, and the consulting firm. There was no clear way to address issues between the
two groups, since the groups were independent. When problems arose, the AP manager
approached his the controller, while the consultants approached their supervisor, i.e.,
someone not employed by DLL. Issues were therefore difficult to resolve. {Politics} One
such problem was that the requirements, as specified, demanded substantial change in the
way a number of functional areas worked. {Unclear Effect, Politics} When this happened, the
team was left to find the best solution it could with little help from executive management.
Effectively, the executives had delegated responsibility for the project to two different
entities, neither ofwhich had the authority or power to resolve any conflicts that occurred.
The project team, when faced with the approaching deadline and lack ofmoney,
simply scaled back what requirements it could. Therefore, the project never fully met its
goals: problems reconciling the vendor funding accounts were occurring over a year after the
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project ended. Although the company avoided the large write-off, the user community was
largely unhappy with the project results.
Remittance Processing Department Improvements (RPD) {High Involvement}
ill the summer of 2000, the executive committee decided to address the problems of
the Remittance Processing Department (RPD). RPD processed lessee payments; many
customers complained that they did not understand how their money had been used to pay
their invoices. Several ofDLL's vendor partners threatened to leave their agreements ifDLL
did not resolve the issue. Additionally, there was an almost continuous drain on IS resources:
to help answer RPD's questions, a nearly full-time IS employee was required. {Large Stake}
To solidify the project objectives, the executive sponsor arranged for weekly
meetings with all of the departments that had an interest in the project. This created a clear
objective and made the stakeholders aware of the project's effect on their departments. {Clear
objective, Understanding Effect} Moreover, by meeting frequently, the sponsor could easily
stop any "scope creep." {Politics}
Although the executive sponsor stopped scope creep from non-RPD sources, he was
himself a source ofchanging requirements. For example, approximately a month and a half
before implementation, the sponsor wanted to set up a special account for unidentified money
DLL received rather than use an existing process. I I Although the project manager and the
technical staff indicated that this was a risky proposal, the executives overrode this
judgement. The staff then put together a solution that fit within the project timeline. {Micro-
management} It happened that the IS team members' fears were justified: there were a large
number ofunforeseen problems with the solution.
II This is not as odd as it may sound. DLL functions as a private label lessor, providing equipment
financing to the equipment manufacturers' customers. The lessee, ifthe company is doing its job well,
never knows that DLL is involved. DLL, however, may not be the equipment provider's sole funding
source. Consequently, the customer may send all of its equipment bills to DLL, mistakenly believing
whatever the manufacturing finance company name appears on the customer invoice handles all of that
manufacturers' leases.
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The project met its primary goal: it improved the cash application process. Customer .
calls to RPD about payment application dropped, as did the number ofRPD calls to IS. Some
smaller aspects of the project were not completed, however. For example, an automated
credit card processing system was planned, but not implemented,12 The project also went
over-budget, as additional consultants were hired to meet the project deadlines. Overall,
though, the users were satisfied with the results ofthe project. The primary complaint came
from outside RPD. The Collections Department had a difficult time adjusting to the change
because the new application process affected the collectors' commissions. The executive
sponsor used his influence to mitigate this problem by meeting with the Collections
Department's vice-president, explaining the new process and its benefits, and working
through some of the more important issues. {Politics}
Vendor Maintenance {Low Involvement}
DLL's vendor database records the information the company needs to fund vendors,
such as bank account numbers, names, address, and contact information, as well as how a
vendor may be funded13 and how much may be funded in a given time period. It also contains
information critical to approving leases, stich as how much money DLL has loaned that
vendor (or its lessees). Over time, maintenance ofthe database had dispersed throughout the
company's various divisions. Some divisions tended the database more carefully than others
did; ultimately, however, duplicate records were entered, which allowed some vendors to be
funded more than they should and, in general, the accuracy of the data declined. The
executive committee decided that the data was too important for its ownership to be scattered
throughout the company, so it decided to create a small department to maintain the data.
12 In retrospect, this was fortuitous: later analysis revealed that the company often lost money on credit
card payments due to the amount paid to the card processors. DLL has since cut back its acceptance of
credit cards. Automating the process may simply have helped the company lose money more quickly.
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{Business Origin, Small Stake} They selected someone to run the fledgling department and
told him to "fix the problem with IS's help." The business manager's comment was "I didn't
know what their expectations were." {Unclear Objective}
The department manager worked with IS to create a rough set ofrequirements for
programs that would help him better manage the database. Money was secured to fund
several consultants for six months. The IS team and new department manager prioritized the
requests by selecting the least expensive and quickest projects. The team then set to work.
Executive management took little direct interest in the project. The business liaison
said, "For a Vital Initiative, it didn't seem so vital." The executives left how and what would
be done to the project team. The committee also did not seem overly concerned with the
effects ofthe project: as long as vendor database maintenance was removed from the
individual business unites, whatever needed to be done was acceptable. The department
manager had afew meetings with his supervisor, but other than that, there was little
communication between the project's stakeholders. {Project Effect}
The project simply ended after the first six months of funding (essentially insuring
that it would end on time and on-budget). The department manager thought that more might
have been done but the executive committee "decided that one Vital Initiative needed to be
wrapped up," and so the project ended. The customer satisfaction rating for the project was
high, as would be expected since everything was done to suit the new department's manager.
Year 2000 System Renovation (Y2K) {High Involvement}
When DLL's leasing system (ATS) was designed in the mid-1980's,14 the
programmers utilized then current conventions to handle calendar dates: they were
13 Vendors may be funded in advance, i.e., they receive payment from DLL before the company
collects money from the lessee, or in arrears, in which case the vendor receives payment only if the
lessee actually pays DLL.
14 For the sake ofaccuracy, Japan's Tokai Bank owned the company at the time the project began. The
company operated as Tokai Financial Services, Inc.
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represented in the system as a six-digit number in year, month, day order. This decision
created a problem for DLL as the year 2000 approached-data containing the years 2000 and
after would appear to be prior to the years 1999 and before. For a financial company, this was
a serious issue: leases would appear to end before they began, it was impossible to calculate
rates of return, etc.15 Adding to the pressure was the Federal Reserve: as a financial
institution, the Federal Reserve audited DLL. The Fed was keenly interested in maintaining
the stability of the American financial system during the Y2K crisis, and kept close watch on
all of the financial institutions. A poor audit result by the Federal Reservewould have
severely damaged DLL's ability to do business.
The IS staff demonstrated DLL's vulnerability to the Y2K problem by advancing the
system date to January 1, 2000 as a test: it was impossible to take lease applications or
process leases. Ifnot fixed, the company would be unable to operate. DLL did not want to
replace the system because there was a project already underway to rewrite the system.
{Large Stake; Non-Business Origin; Clear Objective} Therefore, there were two approaches
to solve the problem: rebuild the system with expanded dates, so the system logic would
continue to work without substantial modification to the code, or to "window" the dates.
Windowing required that the programs be modified so that dates that are less than a particular
value (typically 1/1/80, represented by 800101) are considered to be post 2000, while those
on or after 1/1/80 are considered to fall in the 1900's. The technical staff believed the
expansion approach was the more desirable one: it was straightforward, obvious, consistent,
and relatively easy to implement. On th~ other hand, the windowing technique presented
several risks. First, the staffwas unsure how to sort DLL's data-it is not a trivial task to
make 000101 (1/1/2000) appear after 991231 (12/31/1999); additionally, DLL used some
IS The problem actually started to affect DLL in 1995, when 60 month leases were scheduled to end in
the year 2000. To alleviate the problem, DLL ballooned all of its leases so they ended in November
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particular values, such as 0 and 999999, as special flags. Thesetechniques would have to be
replaced. Second, the technique required substantial modifications to nearly every DLL
program. Finally, ,windowing would have required the creation of a large number of logical
views of the data that would have negatively impacted system performance. Unfortunately,
executive management believed that the windowing technique was the better solution because
it appeared to be a less expensive option, which, unlike expansion, would not require more
disk space. Storage space was ~t a premium since management was trying to contain
expenses on the old system. The CIa therefore decreed that the windowing technique would
be used. {Micro-management} After a trial project completed in late 1997, the conversion
started in January 1998, with a completion date scheduled for early May 1999.
The CIa was to act as project sponsor. He was, however, in spite of the risk the
company faced, reluctant to spend any money on the project. In a hiring interview he
revealed: "This project is a complete waste of money; I will do everything to keep costs to a
minimum." The project progressed well until mid-1998, although not all of the technical
problems were solved. The CIa had little active involvement in the project.
There was a corporate upheaval in mid-1998. The project to rewrite DLL's systems
was cancelled, the CIa left the company, and the company was put up for sale. ATS suddenly
became a critical system to the company. The executive committee, upon recommendation of
the Y2K project manager, decided to change its approach to the problem. Date expansion was
to be used instead ofwindowing. The project end date remained unchanged. The vice
president of credit took over as project sponsor. The new sponsor immediately created a Y2K
steering committee that would address issues such as notifying vendors about potential
equipment problems, requesting information from those with whom the company had a large
financial exposure, and creating awareness of the problem throughout the company. In fact, at
1999. Undoing that problem was an interesting, but unrelated project.
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some point during the project, nearly every person in the company was directly involved.
{Clear Objective; Project Effects} The sponsor also headed offany attempts to divert IS
resources to new "critical" projects. {Politics}
The project did run over its initial budget because new, faster hardware was required
to enable proper system testing. But the team did meet the other two project management
goals. The focus on the project the new executive sponsor helped develop enabled the team to
work to its full potential. The executive sponsor helped create an environment where the
employees knew that the project was important, were aware that it affected every area of the
company, and that it was their responsibility to help make the project a success. Customer
satisfaction was extremely high: the implementation was nearly painless and few areas ofthe
system needed to be revisited after implementation.
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Summary
The most successful project, as measured by the project management and customer
satisfaction scores, is one that scores highly in both areas.16 Additionally, to examine
successful or ideal executive involvement in consideration of the two high scores, that project
should also have high degree ofmanagement involvement. The Y2K project meets these two
requirements. Some of the characteristics of the project that differentiated it from the others
were:
1. The project consumed a considerable amount oftime and resources. As such,
internal audit monitored the project from about its mid-point, increasing the
likelihood that standard project management methodologies would be used. Also,
the Federal Reserve audited the project twice. This was a powerful force to have
the project run successfully. Upper management was extremely concerned with
both the internal and extenial audits. This encouraged IS to use good project
management techniques.
2. Additionally, the Y2K problem engendered a lot ofpublicity outside of the
company, so nearly everyone understood what was happening and why it was
important. The constant barrage ofnews from the Y2K doomsayers helped keep
the project in upper management's vision. The publicity certainly helped make
the project's objectives clear to the entire company. Although such occurrences
are rare, executive management should strive to make a project's goals as clear as
possible to the entire company.
3. The company and executive management had a large stake in the project. If the
project failed, the company would have been unable to function after 1January
2000 until the systems were fIxed. Management had few options if the project
16 A high project management score is 2 or3. A high customer satisfaction score is 3 and above.
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went poorly. Because the system re-write had failed, there was not enough time
to find, evaluate, and implement a commercial software system to replace ATS,
if one could even be found. The project also had a very real deadline: the
company could not avoid the march of time. These factors insured that adequate
resources were available to the project.
4. Once the CIa was replaced and executive management took an active interest in
the project, it performed a number ofkey activities:
a) Executive management staffed a Y2K steering committee, which was chaired
by the project sponsor and had several other executives on it; this created an
environment conducive to success. The company was focused on project. It
understood the effects the changes would have-and what would happen if
nothing changed-and had a clear objective. The Y2K steering committee
made the Y2K problem every employee's responsibility. While such a large,
interdepartmental focus is not always possible or necessary to create, the
executive sponsor can bring together project stakeholders in order to build
support and enthusiasm for the project.
b) The executive sponsor, along with the new vice president ofIS handled any
conflicts-primarily requests for resources to be diverted from the project
temporarily-that the project team could not. There were only one or two
minor diversions of resources to emergencies during the project's run. This
kept the team focused on the project.
c) Management had realistic expectations ofwhat could and would be done.
Although the testing process discovered non-Y2K related errors in the
system, they were not fixed because to do so would have delayed the project.
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Instead, they were logged and addressed after the project ended. Again, focus
on the objective was maintained and scope creep was prevented.
The project shows the power ofwhat happens when a project team, executive management,
and a company share the same goals and vision. Top management's involvement in theY2K
project was a textbook case of how an executive sponsor should act.
Not all that top management did during the Y2K initiative was positive, however.
The technical decision making executive management engaged in during the beginning of the
project could have been a critical mistake if circumstances had not dictated changing that
course of action. In a high-stakes environment, it is usually better to do what is technically
cOl-rect (and this is not always so clear as it was in this case) than to try to do something
inexpensive to get by. This lesson is reinforced by the decision in Credit Scoring 1 to go with
the inexpensive solution. Of course, it is easy to judge management's actions negatively in
retrospect. At the time, the paths followed seemed probably more feasible than they do now.
The two credit scoring projects and RPD are the other high-stake, high satisfaction
projects that had substantial management involvement. Although these projects scored well in
the customer satisfaction category (which is probably the best overall way to rate a project),
all had low project management scores. This is an unexpected finding: a low project
management score, especially ifthe specifications score is zero, should not be a source of
satisfaction. What is it that makes the project satisfactory toexecutive management and the
user community, when the project itself suffers from some combination of delays, cost
overruns, and missed requirements?
The stake upper management has in the project probably overrides all other
considerations. When the perceived stake is large and some threat to the company exists and
if the project successfully meets its primary objectives, then it is likely to have a high
customer satisfaction score. The two credit scoring projects had exceptionally large stakes:
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the company's continued well-being was at risk. To a lesser extent, the RPD project shared
this characteristic, although its stake was not nearly as substantial as the other two. All of the
projects met their key objectives, ifnot everything the plan called for. Therefore, regardless
of how well or poorly these projects were managed, the customer satisfaction results would
be acceptable because the projects addressed a pressing issue.
Another characteristic the high-stakes, high satisfaction, high-involvement projects
shared was that executive management set a clear objective. Because all of the projects hit
their key objectives, and these objectives were well known, it is easier to be satisfied with the
results of the project, even if everything that was set out to be done was not accomplished.
This contrasts with the e-commerce project, which did not have a clear objective. In this case,
the lack ofobjective made it difficult for the project team to work effectively or for the
customers to understand what the IS staffwas attempting to do. Consequently, customer
satisfaction was low.
Although these projects had a high customer satisfaction rating, most suffered micro-
management or had less than helpful executive involvement:
• The technical decision making in the RPD and Credit Scoring 1 projects wasted
time; in Credit Scoring 1, it delayed the project by 6 months and cost the
company a substantial amount ofmoney. In the RPD project, resources could
have been used to meet other project goals. The problems caused by the decision
in the latter project not only wasted IS resources, but also business ones. The user
community's time would have been better spent assisting customers, rather than
dealing with the ramifications of the decision.
• When executive management negotiated heavy-handedly in the second credit-
scoring project, it created hostile environment for project team. Significant
energy was spent trying to clean up the working environment.
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• Deadlines were set with little understanding of the projects' requirements. This
inhibited project management success.
The problems in these projects may have been avoided or mitigated if the project managers
were directly involved in the decision making process, or if they at least had some more input
into the process. The activities of the executives seem to be a sign ofa company that is not
interested in good project management at least at the time; by late 2001, however, there was a
concerted effort to use project management techniques in the company.
The LARC project was the only high-stakes project with a low customer satisfaction
rating. Although the project accomplished its primary goal ofpreventing the large write-off, it
failed to establish effective on-going processes that remedied causes of the original problem.
Also, having originated with a consulting firm, LARC is the only large stakes project that
originated from outside the business community. As such, the consultants' primary goal was
to eliminate the potential write-off, not establish new procedures. Since the consultants acted
as an executive proxy-LARC was a low involvement project-the lack of understanding of
the projects' effects and focus primarily on the write-off objective, coupled with an
inadequate problem solving mechanism, inhibited high customer satisfaction.
The lack ofan adequate mediator in the LARC project contrasts with the other high
stakes projects. That the project sponsor acts as a mediator is an important and well-
documented role in the project management literature. The presence of such a mediator can
save even a badly run project (e.g., e-commerce), smooth over inter-departmental conflicts
(RPD), and salvage a precarious relationship (credit scoring 2). These activities are not
always necessary, but when they are, they are critical. The need for such intervention can be
alleviated by having a clear understanding of what the project will do to the company and
making that knowledge clear to other affected parties, as was done in the RPD project. Some
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of the conflict can also be removed by establishing some sort ofresolution procedure as was
done in the imaging project.
The three low executive involvement projects had customer satisfaction and project
management scores that one would expect; i.e., low project management scores correlate with
low customer satisfaction and high project management scores have high customer
satisfaction ratings. The vendor maintenance and imaging both had a high PM and a high CS
score. The e-commerce project, having a low PM score, had a low CS score.
Two of the low involvement projects did not have a clear objective (vendor
maintenance and the e-commerce project). Although it is almost axiomatic thata project must
have a clear objective to be successful, it is not always necessary. The vendor maintenance
did not have a clear objective set by top management, yet it was extremely successful. In this
case, the IS team worked closely with the end user, so that even though what needed to be
done was notmade clear by executive management, the team worked to a common goal. This
did not happen with the e-commerce department: a clear goal never emerged, and the project
suffered for that failure.
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Conclusions and Recommendations
Given the project data set, the amount ofexecutive management involvement in a
project has little effect on the customer satisfaction rating. The credit scoring projects, RPD,
and Y2K projects all had a significant amount of top management involvement and had high
satisfaction ratings. The absence of executive involvement, however, is not indicative of a
low customer satisfaction rating: the vendor maintenance and imaging projects had minimal
top management involvement, yet had high customer satisfaction ratings. The only two
projects that did not meet their customers' needs, LARC and e-commerce, did not, however,
have a significant executive management presence. Project managers need to maintain a
sense if how satisfied their customers are. Any dissatisfaction should be dealt with
immediately, involving the executive sponsor ifnecessary.
Two of the top management tasks that management must perfonn to insure success is
establish a clear project objective and understand what effects the project will have on the
company. When both these characteristics are present, there is a greater likelihood of success
than when they are not present. The credit scoring projects, imaging, RPD, and Y2K projects
are examples of this. By creating an awareness ofwhat was going to be done (establishing a
clear objective) and by acknowledging what business processes would change (having a clear
effect), executive management allowed itselftime to address any issues that arose.
Knowledge ofthese two factors was done in several manners: project teams held workshops
describing the project, individuals posted project infonnation on the corporate intranet, and
the teams attempted to involve as many areas of the company as possible in requirements
gathering, development, and testing. Executive management gave its approval to these
activities and, in some cases, helped coordinate them. These methods help diffuse knowledge
of the projects' objectives and their effects through the company.
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~If management does not develop the project's objectives and effects, then it must let
the IS team and the users work together on the project without interference, as happened in
the vendor maintenance project. The team, without management guidance, established its
own goals; the business liaison, however, did believe that more guidance from executive
management would have helped the project. This contrasts with the LARC project, where
although management had a clear objective, it did not fully understand the effects of the
project and failed to consider how to keep the problem from reoccurring. Similarly, the e-
commerce project team never developed a clear objective; without that, it was difficult to
understand how the project intended to do and how it would affect the company. Both LARC
and e-commerce had low satisfaction scores.
Top management must address the objective and effects issues especially when the
project originates from outside the business. When the need for a project appears organically,
it is easier to establish an objective and foresee the effects, since the project is a response to
some perceived need. When the project originates externally, however, management must
make sure that the project's objectives and effects are made clear to the business. The Y2K
project provides a clear example ofhow to do this and the benefits thereof. The LARC and e-
commerce projects, however, lacked the clarity necessary for success. Neither executive
management nor the project teams established clear project objectives for the projects. These
failures contributed to their low satisfaction ratings. fu the case ofe-commerce, it also
negatively affected the project management score.
Objective setting usually takes place early in the project. This is when management
needs to be most involved, while avoiding micro-management. In the projects where micro-
management did occur, however, it usually did not affect the customer satisfaction scores:
requirements and changes demanded by executive management are unlikely to cause a
negative satisfaction rating if they are implemented. Such involvement did, however, create
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project management problems, such as scheduling problems, rework, and emergency fixes.
Project managers need to be able to approach their sponsors to explain the effects of their
decisions: negotiating changes and technical decisions can be done if the project manager
approaches the executives rationally and calmly. Executive management also needs to refrain
from setting deadlines before deciding what will be done. While there may be some
compelling business need to set such a deadline, requirements may need to be dropped in
order to meet that deadline (or additional money spent to add resources).
Also important to a project's customer satisfaction rating is how important the project
is to executive management (i.e., the size of the stake). Those projects that are critical to the
company's success, such as the credit scoring initiatives, are likely to be well received
regardless ofhow the project was run. In general, however, the executives appear to be more
concerned with the results of a project rather than the process. This is puzzling, since a well-
run project should be less expensive, less time consuming, and less stressful to the
participants since it is better planned and managed. These are things executive management
should encourage to improve cost management, establish good internal procedures, and
prevent employee burnout. Creating an environment conducive to project management is not
a trivial task, but it can be done (Cameron 2001).
One essential role management must play during the entire project is that ofa
mediator. The executive sponsor is a key figure in resolving differences between departments
and companies. The need to resolve political issues appeared in all of the projects except
LARC, imaging, and vendor maintenance. All of the project managers whose projects
required the political involvement of the sponsor cited the necessity of that involvement,
regardless of the final customer satisfaction and project management ratings. In other words,
when political support is needed, it is essential to the projects' success. Political intervention
can prevent scope creep, prevent misunderstandings between stakeholders, and salvage
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tenuous relationships. If a project sponsor is not to be involved in such activities, there needs
to be a clear mechanism to resolve issues, such as the use of the Quality Department's data in
the imaging project. The lack ofboth a sponsor's political involvement and a dispute
resolution mechanism will hinder a project's success, such as happened in the LARC project.
Not all political activity is good, however. The Credit Scoring 2 project suffered due to poor
negotiations by the executive team.
To conclude, the examples ofDLL executive management involvement in IS projects
follows the lines of the theoretical project sponsor. Whether one individual or a group of
executives acted in that role is dependent on the project under study. DLL has moved from
having general executive oversight of IS projects to establishing a particular sponsor for each
project. The project sponsor can either help or hinder a project. Helpful activities included:
• Setting a clear objective.
• Negotiating and mediating political problems.
• Understanding and explaining the effects ofa project.
• Preventing scope creep.
• Creating awareness of the project throughout the company.
Hindering activities performed by top management included:
• Micro-managing the technical aspects ofa project.
• Creating a win-lose environment with the project vendor.
• Not establishing a clear project objective.
• Abdicating responsibility for the project to an ineffective leader.
Of course, executive management does not function alone. The project manager must help
himselfby insuring that executive management acts to the project's and the company's
benefit. This means communicating clearly and honestly when executive management is
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hindering the project and working to enact positive management involvement in the project
when possible.
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Appendix A
Sample Questions
IS Questions
1. Who was the top management person working with you on the project?
2. What role did they play in the project requirements gathering phase?
3. What role did they play in the system design phase?
4. In the coding phase?
5. In the testing phase?
6. In the implementation phase?
7. How would you characterize the person's involvement?
8. What are some examples oftop management's particularly helpful involvement in the
project?
9. What are some examples oftop management's particularly troublesome involvement in
the project?
10. Overall, how did upper management involvement help or hinder the project?
11. How would you rate the size ofmanagement's "stake" in the project? How do you think
it influenced management's involvement?
12. In what ways did you communicate with upper management? What was the nature of that
communication?
13. How did upper management monitor the project's progress?
14. How well did management understand the project and its implications?
Business Questions
1. How involved was top management in the project?
2. Describe upper management involvement in the project.
48
3. What are some examples oft6P management's particularly helpful involvement in the
project?
4. What are some examples of top management's particularly troublesome involvement in
the project?
5. How did IS communicate with management
6. How would you rate the size of management's "stake" in the project? How do you think
it influenced his involvement?
7. How well did management understand the project and its implications?
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AppendixB
DLL IS Development Project Life Cycle Description
DLL's IS development projects typically follow a standard waterfall ,methodology: 17
Table 8-Standard Waterfall Methodology
Requirements Analysis
The determination ofwhat
needs to be done.
System Design
How the project will be done.
Al
,
System Coding
The actual creation of
programs, etc. in the new
system.
Testing
Insuring the system works as
specified.
Implementation
Putting the system into the
users' hands.
Projects usually proceed through this life cycle linearly, although there are feedback loops
between all of the stages of a project. For example, testing may reveal requirements and
assumptions that initiate changes in the design ofthe project. Overall, however, it is difficult
to move backwards more than one phase.
17 McConnell, pp. 136-139.
50
AppendixC
Project Descriptions
Table 9-Project Descriptio'os
Project Description
Credit Scoring 1 Create a better automated feed from the lease
application process to the credit scoring model,
as well as update the model itself. The credit
scoring system often crashed, leaving the
company unable to process applications for
hours at a time. Additionally, the model did not
distinguish well between good and bad credit
risks.
Credit Scoring 2 Replace the old credit scoring models with ones
that better reflect the requirements of the new
businesses DLL was enterinl];.
Year 2000 Program Renovations (Y2K) Expand all dates from a six-digit format
(YYMMDD) to an eightdigit one
(YYYYMMDD) to allow systems to function
across the 1999-2000 border.
Remittance Processing Improvements (RPD) Improve the way customer money is distributed
among the items on their lease(s). Improve
manual processes, such as reconciliation of
accounts.
E-Commerce Restructuring Create a flexible web-based front end to DLL's
application entry system. This allows DLL to
customize each vendor's site to their own needs,
and makes maintenance ofprivate label
agreements easier than before.
Imaging Enable electronic filing of lease documents.
Eliminate all reports printed on traditional
computer paper by moving them to optical
storage. Reduce unnecessary reports.
Vendor Maintenance Clean and improve the vendor database. Apply
an automatic systems approach to approving
vendors for credit.
Lease Accounting Reconciliation (LARe) Automate the accounts payable reconciliation to
the lease accounting system. The lease
accounting system is how DLL maintains all
lease information. The AP system is a separate
entity that collects data through several
automated feeds, as well as manual input. The
LARC project was to insure that both systems'
accounts matched.
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